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PROPERTY
Symeon Symeonides*
ERROR OF LAW AND ERROR OF FACT IN ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
I. Some Truisms About Errors and Prescription
Let us begin with some truisms: the reason a good faith possessor
finds himself in the position of having to invoke the ten-year prescription
is that he made the mistake of buying from someone who turned out
not to be the owner of the property;' one of the most important functions
of the ten-year prescription is to cure such mistakes; and, if all mistakes
were considered inexcusable, the institution of prescription would be
largely unnecessary.
One of the bases of the ten-year prescription for immovables is the
requirement that the possessor be in good faith at the time of his
acquisition.' The basis of his good faith is his mistaken belief in the
seller's ownership.' Whether founded on an error of law or an error
of fact, this belief is thus the first necessary ingredient of good faith.
If this belief did not exist, the possessor would not have bought the
property, or if he had, he would not be in good faith. If this belief is
not mistaken, then the possessor is the owner of the property and does
not need prescription.
The second ingredient of good faith is the requirement that the
possessor's belief in the seller's ownership be reasonable by objective
standards. 4 Viewed from the opposite angle, this process of evaluating
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I. This truism is graphically expressed in La. Civ. Code art. 3451 (1870), in force
until 1983, which defined the possessor in good faith as "he who has just reason to
believe himself the master of the thing he possesses, although he may not be in fact; as
happens to him who buys a thing which he supposes to belong to the person selling it
to him, but which, in fact, belongs to another."
2. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3475, 3482.
3. See La. Civ. Code art. 3480 which provides that "a possessor is in good faith
when he reasonably believes, in light of objective considerations, that he is the owner of
the thing he possesses." Compare former La. Civ. Code art. 3451 (1870) supra note I.
4. See La. Civ. Code art. 3480, supra note 3.
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the reasonableness of the possessor's belief is simply a process of eval-
uating the seriousness of his mistake and its impact on society in general.
Depending on the circumstances, the possessor's mistake may be ob-
jectively justifiable or excusable, or it may be inexcusable. While the
legislature may determine in advance which mistakes are excusable and
which are not, the better solution is to leave this determination to the
courts. This latter solution was adopted by the 1982 revision of the
Civil Code provisions on acquisitive prescription.' After restating the
presumption of good faith, 6 new article 3481 declares categorically that
"[n]either error- of fact nor error of law defeats this presumption. This
presumption is rebutted on proof that the possessor knows, or should
know, that he is not the owner of the thing he possesses."
1. Old Sins
Article 3481 of the Civil Code of 1870 was no less categorical than
the new article, though it was less specific. That article declared that
"[g]ood faith is always presumed in matters of prescription; and he
who alleges bad faith in the possessor, must prove it." Yet, under the
regime of that article Louisiana courts developed a number of exceptions
according to which certain errors by the possessor would negate auto-
matically his claim to good faith. The first such exception pertained to
all errors of law,7 and the second to a particular species of an error
of fact by the possessor-conducting a title search but failing to discover
5. 1982 La. Acts No. 187, effective January 1, 1983, revised title XXIII of Book
Ill of the Civil Code of 1870 dealing with occupancy, possession and acquisitive pre-
scription. Any reference hereinafter to articles of the Civil Code without further designation
is to the articles currently in force. The repealed articles are referred to as old articles.
For a discussion of the new articles on prescription and a comparison with the old ones,
see Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive
Prescription, 44 La. L. Rev. 69 (1983).
6. For an excellent discussion of the function and true meaning of this presumption,
see Hargrave, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Louisiana Property Law, 46 La.
L. Rev. 225, 237-40 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973),
and Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). This jurisprudence was
based on La. Civ. Code art. 1846(3) (1870), which was repealed by 1982 La. Acts No.
187, effective January I, 1983. This paragraph provided that "lelrror of law can never
be alleged as the means of acquiring .... The error, under which a possessor may be
as to the legality[illegality] of his title, shall not give him a right to prescribe under it."
Nevertheless, it has been convincingly demonstrated that this paragraph pertained to just
title rather than good faith and that, in any event, it purported only to regulate the
vendor/vendee relationship without intending to affect third parties. See Hargrave, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Prescription, 35 La.
L. Rev. 329, 331 (1975); Note, Good Faith for Purposes of Acquisitive Prescription in
Louisiana and France, 28 La. L. Rev. 662, 666-73 (1968).
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the defect in the seller's title.8 Both these errors were regarded as
automatic rebuttals of the codal presumption and as fatal to the pos-
sessor's claim of good faith. Although the authority and soundness of
these exceptions were questionable, 9 they were parroted in numerous
judicial decisions, though more often in dicta than in holdings.
2. New Remedies
New article 3481 has corrected this jurisprudence, both directly and
indirectly. The direct change pertains to errors of law. Rather than
automatically and necessarily precluding good faith as it did under the
pre-1982 jurisprudence, an error of law is now simply one of the factors
for determining "in light of objective considerations"'10 the existence or
lack of good faith. This means that, rather than ending the inquiry the
moment an error of law is discovered, the court should continue the
inquiry in order to determine whether, despite the error of law, the
possessor's belief in the seller's ownership was reasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case. Again viewed from the opposite
angle, this means in turn that, depending on the circumstances, some
errors of law may be found "excusable" while others may be found
"inexcusable.""'
The indirect change concerns errors of fact. It is submitted that
new article 3481 has abolished not only the distinction between errors
of law and errors of fact, but also the very notion that any type of
error may be used to defeat the presumption of good faith in an a
priori fashion, regardless of the circumstances of the particular case.
As suggested elsewhere, 2 despite the lack of a change at the surface,
the new law has thus opened the door for reexamining many other
artificially constructed jurisprudential "rules" that over the years have
undermined the presumption of good faith. One such "rule" is the one
that treated an erroneous or incomplete title search as automatically
rebutting the codal presumption of good faith. 3
Two recent cases provide the ground for testing the accuracy of
these observations. Although both were decided under pre-1983 law,
these cases are well within the spirit of the new law, and are also
8. See, e.g., Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 182, 81 So.
2d 852, 854 (1955), and pertinent discussion in Note, supra note 7; Comment, The Ten-
Year Acquisitive Prescription Of Immovables, 36 La. L. Rev. 1000, 1001-02 (1976).
9. See Hargrave, supra note 7; Note, supra note 7; Comment, supra note 8.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 3480, supra note 3; see also La. Civ. Code art. 3481 ("the
possessor knows, or should know")(emphasis added).
I1. See Symeonides, supra note 5, at 113.
12. See id. at 111-12.
13. See supra note 8.
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illustrative of some of the problems likely to be encountered in its
application.
I. Error of Law
The first case, Lacour v. Sanders,'4 involves an error of law. In
this case, Sanders, the possessor, had bought the property in question
from Jett, his friend and neighbor, shortly after the death of the latter's
wife in 1959. Sanders knew that Jett had been married, but claimed
complete ignorance of Louisiana community property law and its con-
sequences on Jett's power to sell the entire property. Under Dinwiddie
v. Cox,'" this would be a classic error of law and would be fatal to
Sanders' claim to good faith. After noting in passing that under the
new law an error of law does not necessarily defeat the presumption
of good faith, the trial court applied pre-1983 law and found the
possessor in good faith. The court noted that Sanders was uneducated; 6
that he was 'ignorant of Louisiana community property laws"'; 7 that
"'at the time of the sale... the Head and Master rule, was in effect
whereby the husband could transfer full interest in the community by
onerous title without the permission of his wife'; 8 that a title search
would not have revealed that Jett's wife was deceased;' 9 and that "'the
lawyers prepared the deed and kept everything straight."' 20 Finding the
record 'silent as to any information conveyed to Sanders which would
place him on notice to inquire about his title,"'' the court held that
it was 'abundantly clear that ... Sanders was a good faith possessor
of the entire 30.30 acres in dispute.' ' 22 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision, quoting in length the trial court's reasoning.
The supreme court denied a writ by a 4-3 vote.
23
Because it is essentially a trial court decision despite its affirmation
by the higher courts, Lacour may not have much precedential value.
Nevertheless, Lacour is worth discussing because it involves a recurring
14. 442 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d 1221 (La.
1984).
15. 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
16. 442 So. 2d at 1283 (quoting from the decision of the trial court)(emphasis omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1284.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 446 So. 2d 1221 (La. 1984). Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Calogero and Dennis
would grant the writ.
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fact pattern, and because the result is intuitively equitablem and probably
in line with the philosophy of the new law. The court's reasoning,
however, is a different matter. In fact, it would appear that, taken
individually, none of the reasons advanced by the trial court would
suffice to sustain its decision, at least under the pre-1983 jurisprudence.
For example, the possessor's lack of education might be important
in satisfying the first level of inquiry, i.e., determining the possessor's
subjective belief in his seller's ownership. Nevertheless, the individual
possessor's level of sophistication should be rather secondary in the
second level of inquiry, i.e., evaluating the reasonableness of this belief
on the basis of the average, "reasonable-person" standards. Although
the line between the two inquiries may not be as clear as one would
prefer, what should be clear is that a below-average sophistication of
the individual possessor may benefit him in the first but not the second
inquiry, for the same reason that an above-average sophistication would
harm him in the first but not the second inquiry (assuming, of course,
he ever overcomes the first).
Similarly, it is largely irrelevant that the "head and master rule"
was still in force at the time of the sale. In the first place, it is inconsistent
first to sanction the possessor's ignorance of community property law,
and then selectively to invoke on his behalf one particular rule from
that law. More practically, however, the head and master rule was
actually inapplicable to these facts. Had this rule been applicable, the
buyer would have acquired full and immediate ownership of the property
at the time of his purchase, and thus he would not need prescription.
However, at the time of the sale, the seller was no longer the head
and master of the community, since the community had been dissolved
by his wife's death.2 5 Her children, of whose existence the buyer was
fully aware, had already inherited her one half-interest in the property.
It was their interest, not their mother's, that their father purported to
sell. Thus, as in Dinwiddie,26 the actual error of -law involved in this
case was an error about succession law rather than community property
law.27 The court appears to attribute to the buyer the syllogism that
24. One of the reasons that makes this decision equitable is that the plaintiffs, Jett's
children whose interest in the property was sold by their father without authority, had
in fact accepted from their father their share of the proceeds of the sale. They also failed
to communicate to their neighbor, Sanders, their alleged opposition to the sale until 22
years later. See 442 So. 2d at 1283. Although it may be doubtful whether technically
these two facts may amount to either ratification or estoppel, the result is nevertheless
intuitively equitable.
25. See 442 So, 2d at 1281. ('Joe Sanders . .. knew [that Mrs.] Jett died. [He had
even] attended the wake."')(quoting from the decision of the trial court).
26. 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
27. Insofar as the possessor knew that Mrs. Jett's interest in the property had been
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the power accorded the husband by the head and master rule to sell
community property during the marriage continues after, and is perhaps
reenforced by, his wife's death. Such a self-serving syllogism, however,
would transform the head and master rule from a rule of administration
and disposition to a rule of absolute ownership, which was never intended
to be.2" In a way, the court is giving the possessor the best of both
worlds.
This unnecessarily liberal treatment of the possessor is also obvious
in the court's statement that, because a title search would not have
revealed that Mrs. Jett was deceased, the possessor's actual knowledge
of her death was irrelevant. It may be true that, under some questionable
though often repeated old jurisprudence, a buyer who had reason to
doubt the seller's ownership, but did not conduct a title search, is
imputed with constructive knowledge of the contents of the public rec-
ords. 9 To this author's knowledge, however, the reverse has not been
true. A party who did not make a title examination may not claim the
benefits accorded by law to a party who did make such examination.
The court's reliance on the absence from the public records of any
notation of Mrs. Jett's death and its willingness to disregard the buyer's
actual knowledge of that death seem to echo, subconsciously perhaps,
the rule of McDuffie v. Walker,30 that a buyer who relies on the public
records acquires the seller's interest free of unrecorded interests of third
parties, despite his own actual knowledge of such interests. The McDuffie
rule, however, never meant that such actual knowledge has no bearing
on the good faith of a buyer who has not relied on the public records.
Be that as it may, the only aspect of Lacour that is important in
terms of future trends is its treatment of the error of law problem. To
understand this problem one must go back to Dinwiddie, the leading
error of law case. In that case, the possessor knew that his seller's
biological ancestor had left predeceased children other than the seller.
Nevertheless, being ignorant of the rule of Louisiana succession law of
inheritance by representation, i.e., that the share of predeceased children
inherited by her children, he committed an error about the law of mandate. According
to the possessor's testimony, the seller had told him that "'the children all had agreed"'
to sell. 442 So. 2d at 1283 (quoting the trial court opinion). The possessor's error consisted
in the belief that an alleged oral authorization, especially one communicated only to the
mandatary, was legally sufficient to sell immovable property. See La. Civ. Code arts.
2992 and 2997 in connection with the jurisprudential "equal dignity rule" which requires
that such authorization be clothed with the same formalities as provided by law for the
authorized act.
28. Such a syllogism would also be inconsistent with the possessor's claim that the
children had agreed to the sale. See supra note 27.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
30. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
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is inherited by their own descendants,3" the possessor did not try to find
out whether such descendants existed. According to Dinwiddie's oft-
parroted dictum, this error of law prevented the buyer from-claiming
the status of a good faith possessor, because "if he purchased and
possessed under error of law, he thereby became a possessor in bad
faith."13 2 Herein lies the court's own error, i.e., the automatic assumption
that the possessor was in bad faith because of his error of law. What
the court meant was that the buyer's belief in the seller's ownership
was not reasonable, because at the time of the purchase, the buyer knew
of facts-the existence of predeceased children-which would raise doubts
in the mind of the average reasonable buyer about the seller's ownership.
Although this conclusion might well have been correct under the cir-
cumstances, it should not have been reached without first addressing
the intermediate and more pertinent question of whether the possessor's
belief in the seller's ownership was reasonable in light of his erroneous
assumptions about the law.
The Lacour court did slightly better in this respect in that it at
least paused somewhat to consider this question. This aspect of Lacour
appears in line with the philosophy of the new law. Nevertheless, the
process by which the decision was reached, and perhaps the correctness
of the ultimate conclusion, is a different story. The Lacour facts were
strikingly similar to Dinwiddie. In Lacour, the buyer knew that the
seller was married and that his deceased wife was survived by children
who were, in fact, from a marriage other than that with the seller. In
the absence of an error of law, these facts would be sufficient to raise
doubts in the mind of the average buyer about the seller's right to sell
the entire property, and to render his belief in the seller's ownership
unreasonable. Should the buyer's error of law alter this conclusion? The
court appeared all too ready to answer this question in the negative,
without much scrutiny of the particular circumstances, and without any
discussion of Dinwiddie. Unable to distinguish Dinwiddie, and apparently
perceiving itself unable to overrule it, the Lacour court chose instead
to disregard it."
Fortunately, Dinwiddie has been legislatively overruled by the new
revision. This does not, however, automatically make Lacour a correct
decision. The abolition of the error of law doctrine does not mean that
31. See La. Civ. Code arts. 881-886, replacing La. Civ. Code arts. 894-899 (1870).
32. 9 So. 2d at 71 (emphasis added).
33. The court did distinguish the case before it from Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La.
921, 54 So. 2d 325 (1951) and Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d 845 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1973). Juneau was distinguished because the possessor therein .'was warned
against buying the property and told that the title was not good."' Lacour, 442 So. 2d
at 1283 (quoting the trial court opinion). Thibodeaux was distinguished on the ground
that the possessor therein 'was aware of the Louisiana community property laws."' Id.
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an error of law has no bearing on the question of good faith. As said
earlier, it simply means that, rather than automatically defeating good
faith, an error of law becomes one of the many factors on the basis
of which good faith will be determined. The buyer's belief in his seller's
ownership must still meet the objective standards of reasonableness. The
individual buyer's sophistication, if it happens to be below average,
would seem almost immaterial in this determination. The question is
not so much whether the individual buyer could honestly believe that
he was buying from a full owner, but rather whether the average buyer
could have reasonably harbored such a belief. In cases involving an
error or ignorance of law,3 4 the reasonableness of that belief cannot be
divorced from the status in the community at large of the particular
legal rule whose ignorance is invoked. The more widely known a rule
is to the community at large, the less likely it is that its ignorance by
the particular buyer would be excusable, and vice versa. Although there
may be room for disagreement, it would seem that, whether it pertained
to community property, succession, or mandate law, the legal rule whose
ignorance caused the error in Lacour is a rule that is widely known
among Louisianians regardless of educational background.
III. Error of Fact
The second case, Phillips v. Parker,3" involved a very common error
of fact by the possessor: conducting a title examination but failing to
discover a defect in the seller's title. In this case the defect was a mere
thirteen-foot overlap with a neighbor's lot sold to the neighbor by the
same seller in a previous but nearly contemporaneous sale. The title
examiner, an attorney hired by the possessor's attorney, testified that
he had missed the overlap. The court of appeal felt bound by the often
stated but rarely tested jurisprudential theory that "if a purchaser has
34. Technically, an error of law is different from ignorance of the law. According
to La. Civ. Code art. 7, "[alfter the promulgation, no one can allege ignorance of the
law." According to La. Civ. Code arts. 1949-1950, an error of law may vitiate consent
under certain circumstances specified therein, and may thus serve as a ground for the
rescission of a contract. Also according to La. Civ. Code art. 3481, see supra text
accompanying note 6, a possessor may be able to prescribe despite his error of law.
Practically, however, the line between an error of law and ignorance of it cannot be
easily drawn, insofar as the latter is usually the reason for the former. One way of
resolving the potential conflict between La. Civ. Code art. 7 on the one hand, and articles
1949-1950 and 3481 on the other, is to consider the latter as specific exceptions to article
7, which as such, but also as more recent provisions (enacted in 1982 and 1984 respectively)
would prevail over article 7. At the same time, it must be recognized that a jurisprudence
that is willing to excuse all, or even most, errors of law may go a long way towards
undermining the socially useful principle underlying article 7 of not sanctioning ignorance
of the law. To the extent that Lacour reflects such a tendency, it must be discouraged.
35. 483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986).
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notice of facts as to a possible defect in his title to excite inquiry or
voluntarily undertakes a title search, he is charged with the defects the
title examination would reveal in the public records."13 6 Believing that
"[t]his theory of law based upon the public records doctrine ... has
not been altered by the new Civil Code Articles," 3 the court found the
possessor in bad faith since he "voluntarily instituted a title search and
• . . [was] therefore charged with the title defects contained in the public
records." 38 Once again, an error of fact was treated as an automatic
rebuttal of the codal presumption of good faith without any discussion
of reasonableness, e.g., how easily could the error have been avoided,
or how likely it was that a reasonably thorough search could have
revealed it. In an almost unanimous decision,3 9 the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeal and overruled the so-called
theory of constructive notice of the contents of the public records.?4
1. Old Sins Again
This theory of constructive notice has been often repeated but has
rarely been subjected to the scrutiny of reason by Louisiana courts.
Constructive notice would perhaps make sense in a system that makes
title examination a compulsory requirement in the purchase of immov-
ables, at least as an element of good faith. However, Louisiana has
never ascribed to such a requirement. The jurisprudence continues to
adhere to the view that a possessor's claim to good faith is not affected
by his failure to conduct a title search, unless he had notice of facts
sufficient to raise doubts about the seller's ownership.4 ' Viewed inde-
pendently, this "rule" may have its own merits, and is in fact perfectly
consistent with the statutory presumption of good faith. Nevertheless,
when juxtaposed to the other "rule" about constructive notice, the
inconsistency of the current system becomes obvious. The first rule
rewards the buyer who is imprudent enough to take the chance of buying
without a title search, while the latter rule penalizes the prudent buyer
who, even though not required to do so, did conduct a title search,
but was unlucky enough not to have discovered the defect. This dif-
ference in treatment approaches the schizophrenic.
36. Phillips v. Parker, 469 So. 2d 1102, 1107 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985)(citing Martin
v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 81 So. 2d 852 (1955)).
37. Id. Indeed, the comments accompanying the new articles, see infra note 42, may
render some support to this assumption. But see infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
38. 469 So. 2d at 1107 (emphasis added).
39. Justice Marcus concurred in the result.
40. 483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986).
41. See, e.g., Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 226 La. 761, 77 So.
2d 32 (1954); Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1949); Attaway v.
Culpepper, 386 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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2. Time for a New Approach
This differentiation is not justified, much less required, by either
the old or, especially, the new law. While it is true that the above two
rules have been restated by the comments accompanying the new law,
such a restatement should not necessarily be taken as approval.4 2 If
anything, the text of the new law, with its renewed emphasis on rea-
sonableness, invites a reevaluation of this jurisprudence and makes pos-
sible a wholly new approach to this old problem. In a previous article,
this author suggested the bare outlines of this approach. 43 The following
is a continuation of those outlines.
42. Comment (d) under new La. Civ. Code art. 3480 reads as follows:
This provision does not affect the public records doctrine. According to Louisiana
jurisprudence, an acquirer of immovable property is not charged with constructive
knowledge of the public records, nor is he bound to search the public records
in order to ascertain ownership. According to certain decisions, however, an
acquirer . . . who knows facts sufficient to excite inquiry is bound exceptionally
to search the public records and is charged with the knowledge that a reasonable
person would acquire from the public records.
This language is essentially repeated in comment (e) under La. Civ. Code art. 3481 where
it is followed by this statement: "The same is true when an acquirer voluntarily undertakes
to search the public records; he also is charged with the knowledge that a reasonable
person would acquire from the public records, and the presumption of good faith may
be rebutted." (emphasis added).
It is unclear whether the jurisprudence referred to in these comments is viewed by the
author of the comments as part of the public records doctrine and thus as "not affect[ed]"
by the new law, or whether it is restated, simply for information purposes, independently
from the public records doctrine. Be that as it may, saying that this jurisprudence is not
affected by the new law is not the same as sanctioning the jurisprudence and does not
close the door to reexamining it, if the letter and spirit of the new law so require.
As suggested elsewhere, see Symeonides, supra note 5, at 112, this restatement of the
old jurisprudence by the comments could be rendered compatible with the spirit of the
new law, if proper emphasis were placed on the word "reasonable" in the above quoted
statement from comment (e). On the other hand, "[i]f . . . the doctrine (described by
comment (e)J means that a person who undertakes a title search is charged with knowledge
of any defect in the seller's chain of title which is contained in the records, regardless
of whether such defect would be discoverable by a reasonably thorough search, then
changes will be necessary in order for the doctrine to conform to the reasonable person
standard." Symeonides, supra note 5, at 112. This is essentially the difference between
the opinions of the court of appeal and the supreme court in Phillips. The court of
appeal's reading of the jurisprudence was to the effect that the very existence of the title
defect in the public records automatically rebuts the presumption of good faith, regardless
of whether the defect was actually discovered or could have been discovered by a reasonably
thorough title search. It is this reading of the jurisprudence by the court of appeal that
necessitated the supreme court's intervention. See infra text accompanying note 64. De-
pending on one's viewpoint, the decision of the supreme court in Phillips may thus be
seen either as a direct overruling of that jurisprudence, or as a clarification of it with a
shift of emphasis on reasonableness.
43. See Symeonides, supra note 5, at 110-12.
[Vol. 47
PROPERTY
(a) Title search and reasonableness
The development of the new approach must begin by reassessing,
in light of contemporary practices, the role of a title search in determining
good faith. One of the first jurisprudential rules to be affected by such
a reassessment would be the rule which requires a title search only in
suspicious circumstances." This rule seems to be based on the dated
assumption that a title examination is the exception rather than the
norm and is therefore not a required element of reasonableness. In light
of contemporary practices, this assumption is unrealistic and unneces-
sarily liberal. If this premise is true, then a title examination should be
viewed as one of the elements by which to evaluate the reasonableness
of the possessor's belief in the seller's ownership. From this premise
flow two corollaries: (a) that, in the absence of special circumstancess4
failure to conduct a title examination is a factor that normally points
against rather than towards reasonableness; and (b) that the conducting
of a title examination should weigh in favor rather than against a finding
of good faith. Indeed, a title examination that fails to reveal any defect
in the seller's title reinforces, not only the buyer's subjective belief in
his ownership, but also his claim that such belief is reasonable by
objective standards.
If both corollaries are accepted, then the above jurisprudential rule
should be modified in both directions, i.e., (a) failure to conduct a title
examination should be weighed against the possessor when evaluating
the reasonableness of his conduct by objective standards; while (b) the
conducting of a reasonably thorough title examination which failed to
reveal any defects in the seller's title should be weighed in favor of the
possessor in evaluating the reasonableness of his belief in the seller's
ownership. It may well be that the system is not yet ripe for accepting
the first modification. The second one, however, is long overdue, and
may be implemented without the first. If this second modification were
accepted there would be little room for the theory of constructive notice.
(b) Title search and the theory of constructive notice
In any event, even if both of the above corollaries were rejected
together with their underlying premise, there would still be little reason
for retaining the second rule described above, i.e., the rule that imputes
the possessor who conducted a title search with constructive knowledge
of the contents of the public records. In other words, even if a title
44. See supra note 41.
45. Such special circumstances might be "e.g., a bond of confidence between seller
and buyer deriving from family relationships or long friendship, the seller's long and
notorious possession, etc." Symeonides, supra note 5, at 112.
19861
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examination is viewed as the exception rather than the norm in con-
temporary transactions, there would be little reason for either discour-
aging title searches in general, or for penalizing those buyers who, out
of an abundance of caution, find it advisable to search the public records
before they make their investment. 46
If the public records in Louisiana were in such perfect condition
that any search of them would easily reveal whatever defects exist in
the seller's title, then perhaps the theory of constructive notice would
be somewhat realistic. As any title examiner would testify, however, the
condition of Louisiana's public records leaves much to be desired. The
only reason that would seem to render support for the theory of con-
structive notice might be the desire to prevent fraud or collusion between
a title examiner and a possessor. To be sure, it is conceivable that a
possessor who has actual knowledge of defects in the seller's title might
use a title examination that shows no such defects as a shield against
claims of bad faith. Nevertheless, this scenario is not very likely to
occur. Speculators aside, one does not invest money because he hopes
to acquire property ten years later by prescription, but rather because
he believes that he is acquiring ownership immediately upon purchase.
Furthermore, one can not assume lightheartedly that a title examiner
would endanger his reputation or livelihood by participating in a collusive
scheme with the possessor. In any event, the judicial process is capable
of detecting fraud where fraud exists. A remote possibility of fraud in
some cases is no justification for penalizing everybody in all cases.
In sum, implicit in the theory of constructive notice is the notion
that no mistake in a title search is tolerable. That such a notion is
unrealistic, mechanistic, and consequently unfair is too obvious for
argument. It is unrealistic because of the condition of the public records;
it is mechanistic because it treats all mistakes alike, regardless of their
gravity or the likelihood of their being avoided; and, consequently, it
is unfair because it penalizes prudent innocent parties. The net result
of this theory is to restrict the availability of the ten-year prescription
to those imprudent innocent possessors who did not conduct a title
search. This result alone makes the whole theory suspect. It is not
suggested that a title search should automatically insulate possessors
from a finding of bad faith, or that any title search should suffice for
a finding of good faith. What is suggested instead is that, rather than
preventing the inquiry into the reasonableness of the possessor's belief,
a title search should become one of the objects of that inquiry. The
46. At the very least, the courts should have differentiated between, on the one hand,
possessors who, with the statutory presumption of good faith on their side, voluntarily
undertook a title search, and, on the other, possessors who did so only after receiving
"knowledge of facts sufficient to excite inquiry."
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possessor's actual good or bad faith should be determined, not by
artificial fictions, but rather by evaluating, on a case by case basis, all
of the surrounding circumstances, including the condition of the public
records, the thoroughness of the particular title search, the competence
and reputation of the title examiner, the type of title defect involved,
the possibility of it being missed, and other similar factors. This is
essentially the supreme court's approach in Phillips, described below.
3. The Phillips Approach
(a) Title search and reasonableness
In Phillips, the supreme court accepted, and successfully discharged,
the challenge of restoring sanity and consistency to the law of good
faith by reexamining the theory of constructive notice. The court rec-
ognized the absurdity of treating a possessor who made a title search
worse than a possessor who did not. 47 Although the court stopped short
of requiring a title search as an element of reasonableness in good faith
determinations, the whole tenor of the opinion suggests that the court
ascribes to the view that, if conducted, a title examination is an element
that reinforces rather than weakens the possessor's claim to good faith.
A footnote in the court's decision suggests that the court may have
more to say on this issue when the right case arises.
(b) Title search and constructive notice
The main thrust of the opinion is the court's overruling of the
jurisprudence that imputed knowledge of the contents of the public
records to the possessor who conducted a title search. Although the
court was careful not to base its decision directly on the new law so
as to avoid any potential problems of retroactivity, it is clear that the
court was encouraged in its decision by the spirit of the new law. The
court acknowledged that "[tihe 1982 amendments . .. removed the
questionable basis ' 49 of this jurisprudence, and that the court's new
"better approach ... [was] required by the clarification provided by
the 1982 revisions." 50 As suggested earlier, this new approach was also
possible, if not required, under the old law.
After liberating the jurisprudence from the constraints of the theory
of constructive notice, the court was free to address the merits in the
47. 483 So. 2d at 977.
48. Id. at 976 n.6: "IP]rudent prospective purchasers or mortgagees will check the
public records to determine if there are any sales, mortgages, privileges .. .affecting the
property in which he [sic] is interested."
49. Id. at 978.
50. Id. at 977.
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light of its new "better approach."" Beginning with the correct premise
that good faith is statutorily presumed," this approach seeks to determine
whether the presumption has been rebutted by considering "all of the
factors of the particular case relevant to the definition of good faith
in the Civil Code, and not merely by any reference to the public records
doctrine or to any theory of constructive knowledge." 53 To the illustrative
list of factors traditionally considered in good faith determinations, the
court added the "age and nature of the title defect, and other such
factors bearing on the likelihood of discovery." '5 4 "Here," said the court,
"the defect was not . . . easily discoverable."" It was "a simple overlap
in a nearly contemporaneous sale (which had no survey showing the
exact location relative to the ... [possessor's] property) that the examiner
could easily have missed."51 6 "To discover the defect, the examiner ...
had to calculate and lay out the measurements of the two properties. 5 7
Given the "bad condition of the records in that parish at the time,"
the court reasoned "[it would truly be a distortion of the term 'good
faith' to decide that defendants lacked . . . good faith under these
circumstances, inasmuch as a reasonable man under like circumstances
certainly would have believed that the seller had a valid title." 58 The
possessor had "reasonably relied on the professional opinion of the
attorney . . . employed for that purpose." 59 Having started with the
correct premise that the possessor's good faith was presumed by op-
eration of law, the court found nothing else in the record which could
rebut the presumption.
(c) Title search and the public records doctrine
Before addressing the merits, the court first had to clarify the
confusion surrounding the so called "public records doctrine."' 6 This
confusion had been confounded by a statement in the comments ac-
companying new article 3480 that "[tihis provision does not affect the
public records doctrine."' 6' While this statement is literally true, it was
51. See text accompanying supra note 50.
52. 483 So. 2d at 979.
53. Id. at 977 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 978.
55. ld at n. 1l.
56. Id. at 979.
57. Id. at 978 n.l1.
58. Id. at 979.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 975-76. The public records doctrine is codified in La. R.S. 9:2721 and
9:2756. The best treatment of the subject remains Redmann's, The Louisiana Law of
Recordation: Some Principles and Some Problems, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 491 (1965).
61. La. Civ. Code art. 3480, comment (d).
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followed by references to the two jurisprudential rules mentioned above,62
thus justifying an inference that these two rules are part of the public
records doctrine. In a scholarly opinion for the court, Justice Lemmon
dispelled this terminological, and perhaps substantive, confusion. Ac-
cording to this opinion, "[alny theory of constructive knowledge which
imputes knowledge of the contents of the public records to third persons
forms no part of the public records doctrine." 63 The public records
doctrine simply means that an unrecorded interest is not assertible against
third parties, and that a recorded interest is assertible against third
parties whether or not they have checked the records. While fully ap-
plicable to the question of immediate acquisition of ownership, this
doctrine does not prevent the subsequent acquisition of ownership by
prescription. In Phillips, the prior recordation by the neighbor of his
purchase of the thirteen-foot strip prevented the possessor from acquiring
immediate ownership of the strip at the time of his own subsequent
purchase, regardless of whether he had any knowledge of such recor-
dation, actual or constructive. In a system that does not make a title
search compulsory, however, neither recordation alone nor any imputed,
and thus fictional, knowledge of recordation should ipso facto preclude
a finding of good faith in subsequent buyers who had no actual knowl-
edge of the defect. In the court's language, if such recordation "would
absolutely preclude a finding of good faith . . then the theory of
constructive notice would write ten-year acquisitive prescription com-
pletely out of the Code. Such a result is totally unacceptable." 6
(d) Title search and the law of mandate
One of the beneficial side-effects of Phillips is that it reduces the
scope of another related jurisprudential rule: the rule which imputed
the possessor with notice of whatever knowledge, actual or constructive,
was obtained by his title examiner. 65 With regard to actual knowledge
received by the title examiner in the context of a title examination, this
rule was, and remains, justified by the principles of the law of mandate, 66
insofar as the title examiner is a true mandatary of the buyer. Without
this rule, the possessor would be able to immunize himself from ac-
cusations of bad faith by simply delegating the title examination to
someone else. Nevertheless, nothing in the law of mandate ever justified
extending this rule to constructive knowledge imputed to the title ex-
62. See text accompanying supra note 41.
63. 483 So. 2d at 976.
64. Id. at 977.
65. See, e.g., Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 183, 81 So.
2d 852, 854 (1955).
66. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2985 et. seq.
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aminer. As a result of Phillips, this rule would now be confined to
defects actually discovered by the title examiner, whether or not those
defects are actually communicated to the possessor. 67
A question still worth asking even after Phillips is whether the title
examiner is actually the mandatary of the possessor or of someone else.
In Phillips, the possessor had tried to raise this question by arguing
that he had not "directly hired or paid ' 6 the title examiner. The court
of appeal excluded such evidence as "irrelevant. '69 This evidence would
indeed be irrelevant, if, as it seems likely from the facts, the possessor's
attorney were acting within his implied authority when he hired the title
examiner.7"' In this case, the title examiner would have become the
possessor's mandatary, and his actual knowledge would be imputed to
his principal, whether or not he was paid by him. 7' On the other hand,
if for some reason the title examiner cannot be characterized as the
agent or subagent of the possessor, the law of mandate is inapplicable,
and there is no basis for imputing the possessor with the acts or
ommissions of the title examiner. Such may often be the situation in
a typical financed purchase where the title examiner is selected, paid,
and controlled, not by the buyer, but by the finance company.72
ACCESSION AND SERVITUDES
Article 493 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides in part that
"[b]uildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground,
and plantings made on the land of another with his consent belong to
him who made them." Until 1984, this article did not provide for the
fate of these improvements upon termination of the landowner's consent
for their placement on his land. This gap was identified by this author
in a previous symposium article which also suggested six alternative ways
for judicially filling the gap.73 One year later, the gap was filled leg-
67. A footnote in the supreme court's opinion may suggest that the court will assume
bad faith only as to defects actually communicated to the possessor: "Of course, if the
attorney revealed to the purchaser that the seller's title was defective, the purchaser cannot
claim good faith." 483 So. 2d at 978 n.13 (emphasis added). This reading, however,
seems to be negated at least in part by language in the body of the opinion: "At worst,
such a purchaser lacks objective good faith only as to the defects actually discovered in
the title examination." Id. at 978 (emphasis added). But see the underlined phrase. Of
course, both of the above quoted statements are no more than dicta, since the court was
dealing with non-discovered rather than discovered defects.
68. 469 So. 2d at 1107 n.3.
69. Id. On this issue, see Hargrave, supra note 6, at 239 n.43. In light of the way
it disposed of the case, the supreme court did not have to address this issue.
70. See La. Civ. Code art. 3000.
71. A contrario from La. Civ. Code arts. 3007-3009.
72. See Symeonides, supra note 5, at 112.
73. See Symeonides, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Property, 44 La. L. Rev.
505 at 519-27 (1983).
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islatively by Act 933 of 1984 which, among other things, added a new
paragraph to Civil Code article 493. This new paragraph provides that,
upon termination of the landowner's consent,
[the person who made the improvements] may remove them
subject to his obligation to restore the property to its former
condition. If he does not remove them within 90 days after
written demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership of
the improvements and owes nothing to their former owner.
This provision, and Act 933 of 1984 in general, were discussed at
length in another symposium article which identified several shortcomings
of the new provision.7 4 Among other things, it was pointed out that
[t]he fairness of the new provision depends on such factors as
the facility and cost of removing the improvements, their bulk,
and their relative value to the two parties. Although many
combinations are possible, it seems that in case of improvements
which are valueless, yet costly to remove, the landowner is at
the mercy of the builder, since he cannot force removal at the
builder's expense. But in the case of valuable but physically
inseparable improvements, the landowner is unjustly enriched
since he acquires ownership of the improvements without having
to pay reinbursement.11
Guzzetta: The Case of the Unwanted Pipeline
Guzzetta v. Texas Pipe Line Co.7 6 involved the very fact pattern
envisioned in the italicised portion of the above quotation. The im-
provement consisted of a pipeline buried in plaintiff's land on the basis
of a servitude agreement with the defendant. Although the value of the
pipe is not mentioned in the facts, it was presumably much lower than
the $12,000.00 estimated cost of removal in 1986, and perhaps not much
higher than the $250.00 plaintiff's ancestor had received in 1955 in
consideration for the servitude. Asserting that the servitude had expired,
the plaintiff landowner sought a judgment for damages amounting to
the cost of removal. The court of appeal held that the servitude had
not terminated, and consequently, the defendant had the -right to keep
the pipeline in plaintiff's land.77 The supreme court held that the servitude
74. See Symeonides, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Property, 45 La. L. Rev.
541 (1984).
75. Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
76. 485 So. 2d 508 (La. 1986).
77. Guzzetta v. Texas Pipeline Co., 477 So. 2d 1221 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985). The
court of appeal held that the servitude agreement did not contain a term or a resolutory
condition, and thus the servitude could be terminated only by a written renunciation or
prescription of non-use, neither of which was shown in this case.
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could have terminated,78 but since this was a factual question, it should
be decided by the district court, to which the case was remanded for
trial on the merits. The supreme court then went on to opine that
''assuming as correct plaintiffs' allegation that the servitude agreement
has terminated, . . . Louisiana law provides that ownership of an aban-
doned' pipeline reverts to the owner of the land if the owners refuse to
remove it within ninety days of demand. C.C. 493. "79
The court presents this conclusion as flowing inevitably from a
straightforward application of Civil Code article 493. Whether this con-
clusion is inevitable, however, depends on the answer one gives to the
following questions: (a) whether one should resort automatically to the
Civil Code provisions on accession without first scrutinizing the servitude
agreement and trying to ascertain the implicit intent of the parties; (b)
whether this case should be decided on the basis of Civil Code article
495 rather than article 493; and (c) whether, despite appearances, article
493 encompasses improvements which, as in Guzzetta, neither party
wants.
1. Abandonment and occupancy
Before exploring these questions, a few words may be necessary
with regard to a secondary basis for the court's decision. In addition
to article 493, the court relied in part on, or at least cited with approval,
Breaux v. Rimmer & Garret, Inc.80 Breaux had been based on former
Civil Code article 3421, which provided that "[hie who finds a thing
which is abandoned ... becomes master of it in the same manner as
if it had never belonged to any body." In other words, the landowner
was held to acquire ownership of the abandoned pipeline by means of
occupancy.
It is worth recalling at this point that one of the essential elements
of acquisition of ownership by occupancy is the taking of possession
of the abandoned thing "with the intent to own it."8' This requirement
was satisfied in Breaux and previous decisions on which Breaux had
78. The supreme court found that the servitude agreement contained a resolutory
condition in a clause which provided that the defendant holder of the servitude would
retain its rights under the agreement only "so-long as such pipe lines ... are maintained."
485 So. 2d at 510. The plaintiff had argued that this resolutory condition was met in
1982 when the defendant 'abandoned' the pipeline." Id. What the plaintiff apparently
meant was that the defendant had abandoned the servitude, not the pipeline. The supreme
court held that "[w]hether or not any 'abandonment' of the pipeline or right of way
triggered the resolutory clause in the contract, terminating the servitude, is an issue of
fact," id., and remanded the case to the trial court.
79. 485 So. 2d at 510.
80. 320 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
81. La. Civ. Code art. 3418. replacing old article 3421 (emphasis added).
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relied. If only because they arose at a time when mineral exploration
was at a peak and steel was scarce, all these cases involved wanted,
not unwanted, pipelines. Indeed, the landowners in those cases had taken
possession of the abandoned pipelines with the intent to own them.
Obviously, this was not true in Guzzetta, the first such case of the oil
glut era. If it were true that the pipeline company abandoned the pipeline,
it was certainly not true that the landowner intended to own it. To
forcibly make him the owner of the abandoned pipeline would be a
grave misapplication of the law of occupancy.
2. The intent of the parties
In connection with the first question raised above, it should be
recalled that most of the accession provisions of the Civil Code, and
unquestionably the above quoted amendment of article 493, are sup-
pletive in character.8 2 These articles apply only when the parties have
not provided otherwise in their agreement. Consequently, before resorting
to article 493, the agreement must be scrutinized with a view towards
ascertaining the parties' intent on the issue of the eventual removal of
the pipeline. In Guzzetta, the servitude agreement was silent on this
issue. Obviously, however, silence does not necessarily entail lack of
intent. For, according to Civil Code article 2054, "[w]hen the parties
made no provision for a particular situation, it must be assumed that
they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions of
the contract, but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as
implied in a contract of that kind." Thus, the court should have first
looked to these extracontractual sources, i.e., usages and equity, in order
to infer the parties' unexpressed intent on the issue of the removal of
the pipeline. Apparently believing it to be either unnecessary or fruitless,
the majority did not undertake such an inquiry, either before or after
resorting to article 493.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Lemmon did undertake a similar
inquiry, although he did not base it on Civil Code article 2054. Justice
Lemmon began with the assumption that "[a]rticle 493 is silent as to
the allocation of the cost of removal of constructions permanently
attached to the ground, and the court should therefore look to the
intention of the contracting parties." 3 Taken in context, Justice Lem-
mon's statement that article 493 is silent on the issue was apparently
intended to be confined to unwanted constructions, like the pipeline at
stake, as distinguished from wanted constructions.8 4 However, as sug-
82. See Symeonides, supra note 74, at 546.
83. 485 So. 2d at 512 (Lemmon, J. concurring).
84. See text accompanying infra notes 102-104.
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gested earlier, one should look to the intent of the contracting parties
even if article 493 were not silent on the particular issue.
According to Justice Lemmon the intent of the parties should be
determined "from the circumstances of the agreement and the conditions
generally prevailing at the time." 85 This determination "turns on many
considerations such as the character of the land at the time of the
agreement, the location of the land, the type of construction ... and
the effect of the construction on the landowner's ability to use the land
at the termination of the servitude. ' 86 Conspicuously absent from this
indicative enumeration is any reference to the value of the construction
to the two parties. Finding "nothing in this case to suggest that any
of the parties ... contemplated, at the time of the signing of the
agreement, that the pipeline company would ever be expected to remove
the pipeline," 87 Justice Lemmon agreed with the majority that the plain-
tiff landowner had no right to force removal of the pipeline at the
defendant's expense.
Although lacking in detail, Justice Lemmon's approach was essen-
tially correct as a matter of law. Because of its flexibility and deliberate
vagueness, this approach is also preferable to that of the majority of
the court. On the other hand, as a matter of equity, there remain some
doubts about the fairness of the ultimate conclusion. Without an op-
portunity to see and evaluate the record, these doubts cannot be sub-
stantiated. Nevertheless, two factors should have been taken into account.
The first is the ancient civilian principle that ownership is presumed to
be free of burdens, and that such burdens cannot be imposed by mere
implication. 8 While it is true that this principle contemplates primarily
legal burdens, such as servitudes, it is broad enough to encompass
physical burdens as well. Although recognizing "a certain attraction to
• . . [this] idea," 8 9 Justice Lemmon was apparently not convinced by it.
The second factor is that it is difficult to accept that, in a typical
onerous transaction, the average landowner would agree to impose on
his land such a heavy legal and physical burden for so little in return.
Leaving aside the cost of the legal burden to the servient estate for the
duration of the servitude, and discounting for inflation and similar
factors, it should not be readily assumed that, for as little as two
hundred and fifty 1955 dollars, the landowner would agree to impose
on his land a physical burden the removal of which would cost twelve
thousand 1986 dollars. The potential inequity of the Guzzetta decision
85. 485 So. 2d 508 at 512 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Symeonides, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985: Property, 46 La. L. Rev.
655, 665 n.61, 677 (1986) and authorities cited therein; cf. La. Civ. Code arts. 730, 708.
89. 485 So. 2d at 512 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
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becomes even more evident if one also considers the potential environ-
mental hazards accompanying the presence of such a pipeline, not only
to the landowner's own land, but also to the adjacent estates. 9° Ob-
viously, these arguments apply with equal force against the majority
opinion.
3. Article 493 versus article 495
Assuming for the moment that this case had to be decided under
the law of accession, the second question is whether article 493 or article
495 is more pertinent.
The difference in the scope of these two articles has been explained
in detail elsewhere. 91 Suffice it to recall for the moment: that article
493 applies to "buildings, other constructions permanently attached to
the ground, and plantings," 9 that is, improvements which, if owned by
the landowner are classified as component parts of the land by article
463, and "as separate things by article 464; that article 495 applies to
"things that become component parts of the immovable under Articles
465 and 466; 19 and that, among them, the most pertinent to the case
at hand are those described by article 465 as "[tihings incorporated into
a tract of land ... so as to become an integral part of it." Thus, the
answer to the above question hinges on whether the pipeline is classified
as an "other construction permanently attached to the ground," 94 in
which case article 493 would apply, or rather as an "integral part" 95
of the ground, in which case article 495 would apply.
The plaintiff had argued strenuously for the application of article
495, which would enable him to have the pipeline removed at the
defendant's expense. The court summarily dismissed the plaintiff's ar-
gument, reasoning that article 495 "only applies to things that become
component parts of an immovable, and other constructions permanently
90. The majority purported to address this issue in a footnote which provides that
"[tlhis decision, of course, does not affect the duties and powers of the Commissioner
of Conservation under R.S. 30:4(E)(2) to investigate and force corrective measures when
an abandoned pipeline constitutes a hazard to the public's health or safety." Id. at 512,
n.3. Nevertheless, this simply accentuates the potential inequity of the court's decision
since the "corrective measures" mentioned in La. R.S. 30:4(E)(2) are taken against the
"owner of the pipeline" who, according to Guzzetta, is now the landowner. Nor should
one underestimate the potential danger to the landowner's own health or that of his
neighbors who, if such danger materializes, may have an action against him based on
La. Civ. Code arts. 667-669. See Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974).
91. See Symeonides, supra note 74, at 544-46; Symeonides, supra note 73, at 521-
22.
92. La. Civ. Code art. 493.
93. La. Civ. Code art. 495.
94. La. Civ. Code arts. 463, 493.
95. La. Civ. Code art. 465.
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attached to the ground are not component parts of a tract of land when
they belong to a person other than the owner of the ground, as here." 96
Thus, without explanation, the court assumed that the pipeline was not
"incorporated into [the] . . . land so as to become an integral part of
it, ' 97 but was rather in the category of "other constructions permanently
attached to the ground." 9 8 Opinions may reasonably differ as to whether
this assumption is technically correct, 99 but this may well be a secondary
point in the long run.
What is more regrettable in the long run is the loss of a good
opportunity for a judicial delineation of the potentially overlapping scope
of articles 493 and 463 on the one hand, and 495 and 465 on the other,
and, more importantly, for an evaluation of the logic underlying these
articles. Had the court engaged in such an evaluation, it would have
discovered that there is simply no logic underlying these articles.
This absence of logic becomes more evident when these two groups
of articles are juxtaposed, after having been translated into simple Eng-
lish. Here is how they would sound to the layman landowner:
If a thing is incorporated into your land in such a way as
to become an integral part of it, we call that thing a component
part of your land (La. Civ. Code art. 465). This means that
the thing is yours, whether or not you consented to its incor-
poration (La. Civ. Code art. 493.1). If, however, you consented
to such incorporation, you may force the person who made it
to remove the thing at his expense (La. Civ. Code art. 495),
although the thing belongs to you and no longer to him.
On the other hand, if the thing is not so incorporated into
your land, but is merely attached to it permanently with your
consent, then we do not call that thing a component part of
your land (La. Civ. Code arts. 463, 464, 493 par.1). Obviously,
96. 485 So. 2d at 511.
97. La. Civ. Code art. 465.
98. La. Civ. Code arts. 463, 493.
99. According to the official comments accompanying article 465 (see comment (c)),
"[i]ncorporation is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts. It may be
regarded as established when movables lose their identity or become an integral part of
the immovable." It may be difficult to accept that the pipeline in Guzzetta had lost its
separate identity and became an integral part of the ground. On the other hand, since
it was buried in the ground, the pipeline could more easily be regarded as "incorporated
into" rather than merely "attached to" the ground. It is also worth mentioning that one
of the two cases cited by the above comments as illustrative of the intended scope of
article 465 involved a gas tank buried in the ground. Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v.
Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927), held that the gas tank had "become merged into
the immovable (the land] and (had] become so far a part of it as to lose entirely the
character of movables." Id. at 340.
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this means that the thing is not yours (La. Civ. Code art. 493
par.l). Although it is not yours and you may not want to have
it, it may somehow become yours, if the person who put it
there does not want to remove it (La. Civ. Code art. 493 par.2
as interpreted in Guzzetta).
The layman should not be blamed for feeling perplexed by all of
this. Nor should the court be blamed for creating this anomaly, but
only for not detecting it. After all, it is a common secret by now that
this entire area of the Civil Code resembles a pile of "cans of worms,"
and this author for one has had the misfortune of opening some of
them."° Guzzetta helps open yet another one.
Now that this anomaly has been revealed, the remaining question
is how to eliminate it. A legislative intervention is of course conceivable,
but, as with the last one, 0' there is no guarantee that it will not lead
to new anomalies. Thus, the only remaining avenue and the only one
available to a court is judicial interpretation. This brings us back to
Guzzetta. Since article 495 was found inapplicable there, could not the
problem be resolved judicially by a "creative" application or non-
application of article 493? This question is addressed below.
4. Application of article 493
A "creative" interpretation of article 493 could begin by drawing
a distinction between "wanted" and "unwanted" improvements, and
then by inquiring whether the article is applicable to both types of
improvements. With regard to the first type, i.e., improvements which
either both parties or at least one party wants, the answer would be
clear and unavoidable: article 493 would apply on all fours. With regard
to the second type, however, i.e., improvements which, as in Guzzetta,
neither party wants, the answer would not be as categorical.
Article 493 does not address this question directly. In terms of literal
interpretation, one could argue that, since the article does not on its
surface distinguish between wanted and unwanted improvements, no such
distinction should be made by judicial fiat. Nevertheless, as Guzzetta
itself demonstrates, such interpretation may lead to potentially harsh
results. It would therefore appear more equitable if the article were
interpreted as simply being silent on the question of the removal of
improvements which neither party wants. This latter interpretation would
be more in line with the whole tenor of the 1984 amendment of the
article and the background against which the amendment was drafted.
100. See Symeonides, supra note 673, at 519-27; Symeonides, supra note 74, at 541-
650; Symeonides, supra note 88, at 687-90.
101. See 1984 La. Acts No. 933, discussed in Symeonides, supra note 74.
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It should be recalled at this point that Babin v. Babin, 02 the case which
caused the 1984 amendment of article 493, involved wanted, not un-
wanted, improvements. Although the amendment employed language that
is broad enough to encompass unwanted improvements, a fact for which
it has been severely criticized by this author, 03 it would be preferable
to subject this language to a restrictive interpretation. Such an inter-
pretation would be consistent with the cardinal principle that ownership
is presumed free of burdens' °4 and would allow the court to focus more
closely on the peculiarities of the particular case and to reach a more
individualized and equitable solution. In this sense, Justice Lemmon's
view that "article 493 is silent"' °5 on the question is the more equitable
approach in the long run, even though his final conclusion on the facts
might not have been as equitable.
102. 433 So. 2d 225 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983), discussed in Symeonides, supra note
73, at 519 et. seq.
103. See Symeonides, supra note 74, at 519 et. seq. and 543 et. seq.
104. See supra note 88.
105. See text accompanying supra note 83.
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